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WILLIAMS V COMMONWEAL TH AND THE SHIFT FROM 
RESPONSIBLE TO REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
Daniel Stewart* 
The decision in Williams v Commonwealth 1 has significantly restricted Commonwealth 
executive power. The High Court held that the Commonwealth funding agreement in 
question must be authorised by valid legislation. In response, the Financial Framework 
Legislation Amendment Act (No.3) 2012 (Cth) was passed in an attempt to provide 
legislative authority for a wide range of government programs placed in doubt by the 
decision. This comment briefly sets out the basis of the decision in Williams and explores the 
implications that a shift from executive to legislative power (and from responsible to 
representative government) will have for the role of the court in reviewing government 
expenditure. 
Background 
Under the Commonwealth Government's National School Chaplaincy Programme (the 
NSCP), the Scripture Union Queensland (SUQ), a public company incorporated under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), was contracted to provide chaplaincy services to, among other 
schools, Darling Heights State Primary School in Queensland (the Agreement). SUQ also 
had a contract with the Queensland State government to provide similar services to 
Queensland state schools. Ronald Williams, the Plaintiff, whose children were enrolled at the 
School, brought proceedings against the Commonwealth, relevant Ministers and the SUQ 
challenging the authority of the Commonwealth to provide funding under the Agreement. 
Declaratory and injunctive relief was sought in the High Court's original jurisdiction under 
s 75(iii) and (v) of the Constitution and s 30 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). An agreed 
amended special case was removed to the Full Court.2 Each of the States intervened on the 
Constitutional questions raised, and the Churches Commission on Education appeared as 
amicus curiae. 
The amended special case raised three key issues: (1) whether there had been a valid 
appropriation for the Agreement; (2) whether the expenditure of funds under the agreement 
was authorised by the executive power of the Commonwealth under s 61 of the Constitution; 
and (3) whether the Agreement infringed s 116 of the Constitution by establishing a religious 
test as a qualification for an office under the Commonwealth. The Plaintiff's standing to raise 
these issues was also questioned. The majority of the Court3 concluded that the Agreement 
was beyond the executive power of the Commonwealth, and that as such it was 
unnecessary to answer the questions relating to the appropriation of funds, but that it was 
not prohibited by s 116. The Plaintiff was held to have standing to raise those questions 
answered by the Court. 
Government is different 
The Commonwealth's ultimate submission claimed that the Executive enjoyed the capacity 
to contract and spend money lawfully available, in common with other legal persons, 
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because this did not 'involve interference with what would otherwise be the legal rights and 
duties of others'.4 This was unanimously rejected. Some judges drew a distinction between 
the capacity to enter into contracts on behalf of the Commonwealth,S and the power or 
authority to do so. Others suggested that the expenditure of public moneys requires 
questjons of contractual capacity 'to be regarded "through different spectacles,,,.6 
The judges therefore accepted that the role of the government in the expenditure of public 
funds was substantively different from consensual arrangements entered into by non-
government persons. The government contract was recognised as a powerful regulatory 
tool7 which gave rise to a 'need to protect the community from arbitrary government action,8. 
'[B]y contract the Commonwealth may fetter future executive action in a matter of public 
'interest.'9 Financial dealings with the Commonwealth also give rise to criminal sanctions.lO 
For these reasons some limits had to be placed on the Commonwealth's capacity to contract 
and spend money. 
Exploding common assumptions 
Many of the written submissions prior to oral argument made what was termed a 'common 
assumption,11 that the executive power of the Commonwealth included a power to do what 
the Commonwealth legislature could authorise the executive to do. Thus one of the main 
issues raised in the submissions was the extent to which the NSCP fell within the legislative 
heads of power under s 51 of the Constitution, and in particular s 51 (xx) given SUO's status 
as a trading corporation or s 51 (xxiiiA) as a form of benefit to students. Only Heydon J12 was 
prepared to accept this argument and to find that the funding would be supported 
s 51 (xxiiiA). Hayne J13 and Kiefel J14 each rejected the potential for valid legislative backing 
of the program. Thus even if the potential to legislate was sufficient to authorise executive 
action, the NSCP could not be authorised on that basis. 
The. judgments of French CJ, Gummow and Bell JJ, and Crennan J, however, were 
prepared to assume that the Commonwealth could have legislated to give effect to the 
Programme. This was not sufficient. Actual legislative authority was required to enter into the 
Agreement and for the valid expenditure of the funds. Much of the discussion in the various 
judgments involved demonstrating that this conclusion was not excluded by previous judicial 
statements which arguably suggested otherwise. However, the principal justifications for 
restricting executive power involved two related elements: the Constitutional relationship 
between legislative and executive power, and the requirements of federalism. 
Gummow and Bell JJ pointed to the unsuitability of many of the Constitutional heads of 
legislative power to frame executive power. The heads of power include provision for 
taxation and offences, complement the jurisdiction of federal courts over matters arising, and 
are not suitable to executive decree. French CJ goes further in rejecting 'the location of the 
contractual capacity of the Commonwealth in a universe of hypothetical laws which WOUld, if 
enacted, support its exercise' as the means by which to determine the scope of executive 
power. 
Gummow and Bell JJ also stated that reliance on the possibility of statutory support would 
'undermine the basal assumption of legislative predominance inherited from the United 
Kingdom' .15 The responsibility of Ministers to parliament is not sufficient to satisfy the needs 
of representative government, at least 'where an executive spending scheme has no 
legislative engagement for its creation or operation beyond the appropriation process' and 
where that appropriation process involves limited involvement of the Senate. 16 
Other judges also referred to the distinction between responsible and representative 
government, but only to counter the argument that government executive power was 
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potentially unbounded. Crennan J recognised the rise of 'responsible government' in the 
sense of a government which is responsive to public opinion and the electorate as much as 
to Parliament. She referred to the various forms of accountability beyond direct legislative 
implementation as permitting 'the ventilation, accommodation and effective authorisation of 
political decisions': 17 
The principles of accountability of the Executive to Parliament and the Parliament's control over supply 
and eXPsenditure operate inevitably to constrain the Commonwealth's capacities to contract and to 
spend. 8 
Kiefel J referred to responsible government as establishing the relationship between 
parliament and the executive and requiring only that the scope of Commonwealth executive 
power be susceptible of control by statute. Parliament can therefore oversee executive 
action through the possibility of disapproval as well as positive authorisation. On this view 
the potential influence or impact of the executive action in question is not alone sufficient to 
invoke representative concerns. 
The most strongly supported arguments for requiring statutory authority relied on concerns 
that the expansion of Commonwealth executive power impacted on State interests. As 
French CJ put it: 
Expenditure by the Executive government of the Commonwealth, administered and controlled by the 
Commonwealth, in fields within the competence of the executive governments of the States has, and 
always has had, the potential, in a practical wal of which the Court can take notice, to diminish the 
authority of the States in their field of operation.1 
Allowing the Commonwealth government to enter, without statutory authority, into a field 
where the Commonwealth and State governments have concurrent competencies might give 
rise to questions of inconsistency without the reconciliation effected by s 10920 and would 
undermine the availability of the grants power under s 96.21 It would ignore the distinctions 
drawn in identifying those aspects of non-statutory power which derive from the peculiar 
capacities of the Commonwealth government to Act in a way the States cannot.22 And the 
role of the Senate, even if it be 'vestigial'23 in representing State interests, is impeded 
through the limited ability of the Senate to scrutinise appropriation Bills under s 53 of the 
Constitution. 
It thus appears that the requirement for statutory authorisation is primarily derived from the 
need to limit the potential interference with State interests, through more direct reliance on 
various heads of legislative power and the capacity for legislative predominance over mere 
executive action or s 109 to resolve any inconsistencies. 
Where to now for executive power 
The judgments suggest that the scope for executive action is limited to that which is: 
an exercise of the prerogative power unique to the Crown as attributable to the 
Commonwealth; 
incidental to giving effect to the execution and maintenance of a valid law of the 
Commonwealth; 
carried out in the administration of a department of State in the sense used in s 64 of the 
Constitution; or 
an exercise of inherent authority derived from the character and status of the 
Commonwealth as a national government.24 
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In NSW v Bardolph25 it was suggested that no statutory power is required to make a contract 
in the ordinary course of administering a recognised part of the government.26 Several 
comments in Williams indicate that this proposition may not be generally applicable to the 
Commonwealth,27 at least as it purports to extend beyond the administration of a department 
of state under s 64 of the Constitution28 or the entering into agreements with the States.29 
Office ... under the Commonwealth 
The majority made short work of the argument that the Program requires a religious test as a 
qualification for an office under the Commonwealth contrary to s 116 of the Constitution. The 
chaplain in question is 'under the control and direction of the school principal' and is not 
under any 'contractual or other arrangement with the Commonwealth' .30 The provision of 
Commonwealth funding is not enough. It was argued that even if the meaning of 'office' is 
not restricted in s 116, unlike other provisions like s 75(v) perhaps, the term 'under' requires 
'a closer connection to the Commonwealth than that presented by the facts in this case.,31 
Heydon J, however, dismissed the importance of 'under' suggesting rather that an 'office' is 
a position under constituted authority to which duties are attached.32 This requires a direct, 
legal relationship with the Commonwealth. Contractual obligations enumerating standards 
and monitoring compliance by parties not directly subject to the contract are not sufficient. 
Otherwise the original jurisdiction of the High Court under s 75(v) would be widened even 
beyond its beneficial limits. 
All judges therefore accepted that a more direct relationship is required before the 
parameters of an 'office' under or of 'the Commonwealth' are breached. Whether a more 
direct contractual relationship might suffice was not considered by the majority, but there is 
little to indicate that statutory authorisation of the contracts in question would affect this 
question. 
Standing 
The question of standing is no clearer. All judges except Heydon J agreed with the 
conclusion of Gummow and Bell JJ that standing was established to challenge the validity of 
the Agreement and the making of payments under it.33 However, Gummow and Bell JJ 
avoided detailed consideration of the question given that Victoria and Western Australia also 
sought to challenge the scope of executive power. Even in the absence of any power to 
intervene any State would have standing to challenge 'the observance by the 
Commonwealth of the bounds of the executive power assigned to it by the Constitution'. 34 
The 'real issue' as to the Plaintiff's standing to challenge the sufficiency of the appropriation 
by Parliament was recognised, but not pursued given it did not affect the validity of the 
funding agreement which was the focus of the case. It appears that the grant of standing 
was therefore based on the acceptance by the Commonwealth of the Plaintiff's standing to 
challenge funding arrangements which affected the Plaintiff's children while they attended 
the school and which continued in operation at the time proceedings were commenced. Only 
Heydon J examined this point at any length, concluding that, on the Plaintiff's submission, 
chaplains funded by the Agreement were directly involved in the education of his daughters, 
which was sufficient to give rise to a sufficient special, if non-material, interest in having a 
judicial determination of the validity of at least one payment under the Agreement.35 
So the funding agreement is therefore subject to challenge only due to the direct 
involvement of the Plaintiff in the activities funded by the agreement. The nature of that 
involvement and the extent to which it extends to other ways third parties may be affected 
through the awarding of contracts or spending was not considered. 
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The legislative response 
A week after the Williams decision, Parliament passed the Financial Framework Legislation 
Amendment Act (No.3) 2012 (Cth) (the Amendment Act).36 The Amendment Act purports to 
provide legislative authority to a wide variety of government programs whose validity was 
thrown into doubt by the decision in Williams. It inserts s 328 into the Financial Management 
and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth) (the FMA Act). Section 328 provides that, where it did not 
otherwise have power, the Commonwealth has the power to make, vary or administer 
agreements37 or grants included in the Regulations. The Act also amends the Financial 
Management and Accountability Regulations 1997 (Cth) to insert Schedule 1 AA, which 
includes a list of 'Grants of financial assistance to persons other than a State or Territory', 
and a list of 'Programs', collected under the respective Department or administering body 
and providing only the title and brief objective. 
Section 44 of the FMA Act is also amended by taking the Chief Executive's responsibilities to 
manage the affairs of the Commonwealth in s 44(1) to include, and have included, the power 
to make, vary and administer agreements on behalf of the Commonwealth, though not in 
relation to a power conferred by the new s 328. This is intended to provide the power to 
spend money where that is related to the affairs of the agency in question. The majority in 
Williams had characterised s 44 of the FMA Act as only being directed to the prudent 
conduct of financial administration.38 
Transitional provisions provide that arrangements and purported arrangements that would 
have been authorised by the new s 328(1) but which were made prior to the amendments 
and in force immediately before the commencement of these provisions are taken to have 
effect as if they had been made under the new s 328(1). 
The amendments also exclude decisions made under the new s 32839 from review under the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act). 
Questions arising 
The legislative response suggests that the decision in Williams will not significantly expand 
the role of the Senate in supervising government expenditure. Whether arrangements for 
new spending programs will be subject to greater scrutiny prior to enactment remains to be 
seen. The threat of Constitutional challenges based on exceeding a Commonwealth head of 
power remains. However, it is unclear whether the shift to statutory authority for the broad 
range of programmes listed in the amendments will have significant implications for 
government contracting more generally. 
Excluding decisions made under the new s 328 from review under the ADJR Act may be 
considered unnecessary given the test in Griffith University v Tang. 40 It remains to be seen 
whether the principles set out in that test, and in particular the requirement that the decision 
under review have the capacity to affect rights and obligations derived from a public source 
of authority, are applicable to other avenues for review, and particularly if they apply 
differently depending on whether executive or legislative power is exercised.41 The 
Explanatory Memorandum for the amendments states that review under s 75 of the 
Constitution and s 398 of the Judiciary Act 1903 would still be available,42 but where the only 
rights and obligations that arise under the newly statute-based spending agreements derive 
from contract, the extent of any review beyond constitutional conformity will be very limited. 
While it is accepted that the power to enter into contracts can be subject to statutory 
constraint, the nature of those constraints and the extent to which they affect the validity of 
any contract is a question of statutory construction.43 The new s 328 provides authority to 
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enter into the particular arrangement or grant directly or 'for the purpose of a program 
specified in the regulations'. Given the programs are defined by no more than a title and 
broadly stated objective it is difficult to derive limits on the nature of the arrangements which 
might meet that purpose. It may be that there are some express or implied limits that would 
be required to meet constitutional requirements for a valid law.44 However, the terms of 
s 328 do not appear to impose more restrictions than would apply if the legal authority for 
the arrangements were sourced in executive power. 
The authority provided by the new s 32B conditions the grant of power as subject to 
compliance with the FMA Act and regulations, Finance Minister's Orders, special instructions 
and any other law.45 Given the varied and indistinct nature of many of these requirements it 
is unlikely that they condition the validity of any contracts or grants made. The nature of 
decisions made relating to the exercise of rights and obligations arising under the contracts, 
such as the application of criteria for entering into or enforcing performance of contracts is 
thus not likely to be conditioned through additional criteria imposed through the statutory 
authorisation contained in the Amendment Act. 
Other elements of Wil/iams may also have a limited effect on the capacity to challenge the 
range of contracts or grants in question. The States will continue to have standing to 
challenge the constitutional basis of any arrangements; individuals may have standing to 
challenge only when directly affected by the contract or grant in question. The s 32B grant of 
authority to the Minister or Chief Executive will not of itself bring other parties to the contract 
or third parties involved in fulfilling any grant conditions, within the definition of an 'office' 
either under or of the Commonwealth. 
The extent to which the Williams decision applies to other forms of executive power, 
including the power to make inquiries, remains uncertain.46 An inquiries power may not have 
the same regulatory effect as funding agreements, may be more readily classified as within 
the administration of a department of state and arguably has less impact on State interests. 
However, the same question arises as to whether the shift to statutory authority will 
substantially change the available grounds of judicial review. 
The judgments in Wil/iams do recognise the expanded role of government contracting in 
achieving regulatory objectives in modern government, but the shift to representative 
accountability is required principally for compatibility with State, rather than individual, 
interests. But the States gain little in the way of protection of those interests if the degree of 
parliamentary scrutiny required is as limited as the amendments to the FMA Act would 
suggest, and may now be concerned with the consistency of their own programs with those 
of the Commonwealth.47 
Gummow and Bell JJ refer to the need for parliamentary engagement with the 'formulation, 
amendment or termination' of expenditure programs. Crennan J similarly refers to a 
parliamentary process of 'scrutiny and debate',48 and the need for 'some details about the 
policy being authorised' .49 However, neither of these requirements seems justiciable. 
Whether or not the decision in Williams will be accompanied by the required statutory source 
of authority to impose additional criteria of validity, and in the process create incentives for 
enhanced parliamentary consideration of express criteria, are questions which await clear 
answers. 
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